Deng Xiao Peng’s doctrine of “Tao Guang, Huang Ye” – meaning “Maintain a low profile, bide your time, and keep making progress and development,” laid China’s military and economic base in 1979. The doctrine was abandoned with the rise of Xi Jinping in favor of his doctrine, “Fan Yao Wei” – an aggressive projection of Chinese power. It has been applying the new doctrine to exploit the weaknesses of the adversaries the world over attacking the vulnerable and democracies.
India and China share an approximately 4,050km-long border divided into the Western, Middle, and Eastern Sectors. The border is almost entirely disputed except in Sikkim and smaller segments in the Western and Middle Sectors.
Post-1962 Sino-India conflict, India has been firmly responding to Chinese challenges by inflicting heavy casualties from Nathu La and Chola in 1967 to recent skirmishes in Galwan in 2020. Indian leadership today understands that the traditional doctrine of “war avoidance” is no longer an option and that is why the right kind of noises are being made about the “heavy cost of war.”
Rajnath Singh, India’s defence minister said in April 2022, “If harmed, India won’t spare anyone.” Since the 1980s, the Chinese and Indian Governments have made attempts to resolve the border disputes through diplomatic negotiations in a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) on the border management in form of bilateral agreements signed in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012, and 2013.
The agreement of 2005 was hailed as a game changer with a provision for the forward movement of troops for the border but was rendered useless as China altered the status quo on the ground prior to April 2020 in blatant violation of all protocols and agreements. Moreover, with its “New Land Border Laws” brought into force in January 2022, China is not only belligerent but also full of shenanigans.
Although troops disengaged from the Gogara area in August 2021 and pulled back from the North and Southern Banks of the Pangong Tso Lake, disengagement at Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in Gogra – Hot Spring area and India’s insistence on an overall de-escalation in Ladakh rounds of Corps Commander level talks in March 2022. While Depsang and Demchok, where a build-up predates the current stand-off continue to remain vulnerable to hostility would want to block this launchpad through Uttar Pradesh, India had reposed the Lipulekh pass for Kailash Mansarovar following the construction of a 22 km road in May 2020.
This route was closed in aftermath of the Chinese aggression in 1962. Both India and Nepal lay claim to origins of the river while it continues to remain under the control of India since 1962. China perceives the development of this road to the north as a potential threat to Mysinet on Western
There are a total of 27 “Points of Disputes and Sensitive Areas” at the Indo-China border that witnesses aggressive patrolling and face-offs between troops of both sides. In the western sector, there are about 12 major “Points of Dispute.” Middle Sector has approximately 1,820 sq. km of the disputed area in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh with four points of dispute. Eastern Sector includes approximately 900,000 sq km of the disputed area in Arunachal Pradesh, and there are a total of 11 points of dispute, three in Sikkim and eight in Arunachal Pradesh.
DS-DBO road is all-weather logistics support to the Indian troops in the proximity of China’s G219 – Western Highway connecting Lhasa in Tibet with Kashgar in Xinjiang Province and the Karakoram Highway, the backbone of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) running from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar in Baluchistan. India has also strengthened the DBO sector after Galwan 2020. It has renovated the Advance Landing Ground at DBO and has enhanced its offensive capabilities manifold.
As a long-term measure, China would not only like to deny this advantage to India but may also try to seize or capture it.
Balistan from Aksai Chin. It is this strategic capability of the area which is proving a thorn in China-Pakistan flesh. Therefore, China would not only like to deny this advantage to India but may also try to seize or capture it.
How prepared is India?
Indian Army occupying strategically located heights on the Kailash Pangong Tso Lake in August 2020 was a strong message to China that India is always prepared to deliver a fitting response. The Chinese leadership had thought that it had delivered a fait accompli on India in Eastern Ladakh, which would be accepted without any countermeasure. Moreover, India holding on in the face of China’s much-vaunted military and economic might along the Northern border for close to two years of the 2020 standoff has also shown that the “asymmetry of power” argument does not stand to be relied upon to undermine China would be to relieve the fallacies that led to the 1962 war.
India needs immediately update its traditional war strategy to “Punitive Deterrence,” ultimately moving forward to “Offensive Defense Capability.” It would require more budget allocations and a strategy consistent with strategic goals for decades to come.
Note: This article was fist published in The South Asian Times.